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Abstract
The problem of unconditional security of quantum cryptography (i.e. the security which is guaranteed by the
fundamental laws of nature rather than by technical limitations) is one of the central points in quantum information
theory. We propose a relativistic quantum cryptosystem and prove its unconditional security against any eaves-
dropping attempts. Relativistic causality arguments allow to demonstrate the security of the system in a simple
way. Since the proposed protocol does not employ collective measurements and quantum codes, the cryptosystem
can be experimentally realized with the present state-of-art in fiber optics technologies. The proposed cryptosystem
employs only the individual measurements and classical codes and, in addition, the key distribution problem allows
to postpone the choice of the state encoding scheme until after the states are already received instead of choosing
it before sending the states into the communication channel (i.e. to employ a sort of “antedate” coding).
PACS numbers: 03.65.Bz, 42.50.Dv, 89.70.+c
The idea of quantum cryptography was first proposed in the paper of Wiesner [1] which, because of the novelty of
the developed approach, had not been published for a long time and only existed as a manuscript. The idea of Wiesner
became commonly known after the publication of the paper of Bennett and Brassard [2]. An important advance was
made in Refs. [3] and [4]. Ekert proposed a cryptosystem based on the EPR-effect [5]. Bennett et al [4] demonstrated
that any eavesdropping attempt can be reliably detected employing an arbitrary pair of non-orthogonal states. Later
a large number of quantum cryptosystems and their realizations were proposed [6] which are not guaranteed to be
unconditionally secure. Currently there exist three proofs of the unconditional security. The proof due to Mayers [7]
addresses the so-called BB84 protocol [2] and so does the paper of Biham et al [8]. The proof of Lo and Chau [9] deals
with the protocol based on the EPR-effect [3] and, in contrast to Ref. [7], requires the access of legitimate users to a
quantum computer. The fact that these proofs have not yet become commonly accepted seems to be due to the lack
of a qualitative interpretation of their internal structure. Shor and Preskill [10] attempted to simplify these proofs
by explicitly using the quantum codes. The first relativistic quantum cryptosystem was proposed by Goldenberg and
Vaidman [11]. The proof of its unconditional security is outlined in Ref. [12]. In our opinion, the major obstacle in
proving the unconditional security in Refs. [7–10] arises because the corresponding protocols are formulated as the
exchange protocols in the Hilbert state space and do not explicitly employ the causality considerations and the fact
that the legitimate users are spatially separated although in real life the transmission of information always implies the
preparation of information carriers (quantum systems), their propagation through the communication channel between
two distant users, and, finally, performing a measurement of the quantum state of the information carriers at some
later time. The restrictions imposed on the measurability of quantum states by special relativity were first considered
by Landau and Peierls as early as in 1931 [13]. Further analysis was performed in the paper of Bohr and Rosenfeld
[14].
Let us begin with the formulation of the protocol security criterion. Such a criterion seems to have been first
explicitly formulated in the work of Mayers [7]. Here we shall adopt a different criterion which is more convenient for
our proof. The protocol should satisfy the two requirements which informally can be outlined in the following way: the
two strings of N classical bits sA(N) and sB(N), possessed by users A and B after the protocol is completed should
be (1) identical and (2) known to nobody else. More formally, a protocol is secure if for any N ≥ 1 and any pair of
real numbers ε1 > 0 and ε2 > 0 its parameters (the employed states, measurements, etc.) can be chosen in such a way
that:
1. The probability for the two strings sA(N) and sB(N) to differ in at least one bit is less than ε1 > 0, i.e.
Pr{sA(N) 6= sB(N)} ≤ ε1; (1)
in other words (in the language of mutual information between users A and B) for any ε′1 > 0 it is possible to satisfy
the inequality
I(A;B) ≥ N − ε′1. (2)
1
2. The probability for the eavesdropper E to learn the string sA(N) exceeds the probability of a simple guess, 2
−N ,
(remember that error probability associated with simply guessing a particular bit is 1/2 and represents the worst
eavesdropper strategy) by no more than ε2:
Pr{sA(N) = sE(N)} ≤ 2−N + ε2; (3)
equivalently, the eavesdropper has arbitrarily small information on the strings sA(N) and sB(N) adopted as the key
of length N by legitimate users:
I(A;E) ≤ ε2, I(B;E) ≤ ε2. (4)
Here the string of bits adopted as the key should not be understood the bits the original bits sent by user A: each bit
of the key is actually a function of the original bits sent by user A which passed the appropriate tests performed by
user B aimed at detection of eavesdropping attempts.
If a single classical bit is to be transmitted, the user A associates with the logical states 0 and 1 of the classical
bit the density matrices ρ0 and ρ1 which can be chosen with the a priori probabilities pi0 and pi1, pi0 + pi1 = 1.
Classical information is extracted by performing quantum measurements on the system described by the density
matrix ρ = pi0ρ0 + pi1ρ1. The measurements are described by the identity resolutions in the state space,
∑
iEi = I.
Information on the classical bit sent by user A available to user B is defined as the mutual information maximized over
all possible measurements which can be performed by user B:
I(A;B, ρ0; ρ1) = max
{Ei}
∑
i
{
pi0Tr{ρ0Ei}log2
(
Tr{ρ0Ei}
Tr{ρEi}
)
+ pi1Tr{ρ1Ei}log2
(
Tr{ρ1Ei}
Tr{ρEi}
)}
. (5)
A fundamental upper boundary on the available information is given by the inequality first proved by Holevo [15] (see
also [16]):
I(A;B, ρ0; ρ1) ≤ SvN (ρ)−
∑
i=0,1
piiSvN (ρi), SvN (ρ) = −Tr{ρlog(ρ)}, (6)
where SvN (ρ) is the von Neumann entropy [17], and the equality is reached if and only if the density matrices ρ0 and
ρ1 commute whit each other. For pure states the latter means that the equality in (6) is reached only for orthogonal
states (ρ0,1 = |ψ0,1〉〈ψ0,1| and 〈ψ0|ψ1〉 = 0). In that case the available information reaches the maximum possible value
of
Imax(A;B, ρ0; ρ1) = 1 E0 = P0 = |ψ0〉〈ψ0|, E1 = P1 = |ψ1〉〈ψ1|. (7)
In other words, reliable distinguishability of the orthogonal quantum states allows to transmit the maximum possi-
ble classical information. However, just because of their reliable distinguishability they cannot be used in quantum
cryptography (at least in the protocols employing the Hilbert state space properties only).
It should be emphasized that it is implicitly assumed in Eqs. (5–7) that the entire Hilbert state space is always
available for measurements. The fact that the causality arguments are not explicitly used should be understood as
the possibility for user B to perform the measurement over a quantum state |ψi〉 prepared by user A at time tA at
arbitrary later time (formally, even at tB = tA + 0). The measuring operators Ei at different times are related by
the expression Ei(tB) = U(tB − tA)EiU−1(tB − tA), where Ei is the measuring operator taken at time tA. Then
the available information (5) does not depend on time and can be obtained immediately after the measurement is
performed.
The above formulation of the problem is not only unnatural, but it does not correspond to the real procedure of
information transmission between two distant parties. As a matter of fact, the information (to be more precise, the
physical quantum objects carrying that information) always propagate from one user to the other. Therefore, it is
much more natural to formulate the problem explicitly taking into account the causal relations between the states
preparation, propagation, and measurements preformed on these states as they reach the second user and become
available to his measurement apparatus.
Since the information is carried in the Minkowskii space-time by real physical objects, e.g. photons (rather than
the abstract physical systems and the rays in Hilbert state space ascribed to them as frequently assumed in the non-
relativistic quantum information theory), the role of the instrument (superoperator) in the quantum field theory is
played by the quantum electrodynamical Sˆ-matrix. The latter should satisfy the unitarity and causality requirements
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first explicitly derived by Bogolubov [18]:
SˆSˆ+ = I, δSˆ(g)
δg(yˆ)
Sˆ+(g) = 0, for xˆ ≤ yˆ, (8)
which means that the Sˆ-matrix does not depend on the behavior of g(xˆ) (the function specifying how the interaction
is switched on) at point xˆ ≤ yˆ separated from yˆ by a space-like interval. We do not know whether it is possible
to develop a protocol based on the first principles (general structure of the Sˆ-matrix) alone. Therefore, in the rest
of the paper we shall adopt a simple one-dimensional model containing all the necessary restrictions imposed by the
relativistic causality. In addition, the adopted approach is further justified by the fact that the real fiber optics quantum
communication channels are actually quasi-one-dimensional systems.
We shall first describe the states and measurements used in the protocol. Legitimate users control the spatially
separated domains ΩA and ΩB of size L. When the protocol is started at tA = 0, user A prepares with equal probabilities
one of the following two orthogonal states corresponding to 0 or 1:
|ψ0,1〉 =
∫ ∞
0
dkF(k)a+0,1(k)|0〉 =
∫ ∞
0
dkF(k)|k, e0,1〉 = |F , e0,1〉, |k, e0,1〉 = a+0,1(k)|0〉, 〈k, ei|k′, ej〉 = δ(k − k′)δij ,
(9)
where a+0,1(k) is the operator creating a photon with momentum k > 0 and one of the two orthogonal polarization
states e0 and e1, F(k) is the state amplitude in momentum representation, i, j = 0, 1, k ∈ (0,∞). In the position
representation the states are written as
|ψ0,1〉 =
∫ ∞
−∞
F(x−t)|x, t〉⊗|e0,1〉, F(x−t) =
∫ ∞
0
dkF(k)eik(x−t), 〈k|x, t〉 = 1√
2pi
eik(x−t), x, t ∈ (−∞,∞). (10)
The amplitude F(x − t) depends on the difference x − t only, in agreement with the intuitive picture of a packet
propagating in the positive direction of the x-axis with the speed of light and having the spatio-temporal shape
described by F(x − t).
It should be noted that the basis vectors |x, t〉 are not orthogonal. Normalization of the state vector in the position
representation can be written as [19] ∫ ∞
−∞
dxeik(x−t)
1
x− t+ a = ipi sgn(k)e
−ika, (11)
〈ψ0,1|ψ0,1〉 = 〈F|F〉 =
∫ ∞
−∞
∫ ∞
−∞
dxdx′F(x− t)F∗(x′ − t)[1
2
δ(x− x′) + i
pi
1
x− x′ ] =
∫ ∞
−∞
|F(x− t)|2dx. (12)
The states are chosen to be almost “monochromatic”, so that the amplitude F(τ) ≈ const ≈ 1/
√
L is actually
represented by a constant wide “plateau” (to within the tails at its ends) and∫
{L}
dx|F(x − t)|2 = 1− δ, δ → 0. (13)
The decay at the ends can be chosen to be arbitrarily sharp and making δ arbitrarily small. We shall assume that the
latter condition is satisfied and the parameter δ is well the smallest parameter in the problem1.
1In our one-dimensional model the non-localizability [20–22] can be derived from the Wiener-Paley theorem [23]. Normalization and
square integrability conditions in the k-representation taken together impose restrictions on the asymptotic behavior of the function F(τ):
F(τ) =
∫
∞
0
F(k)e−ikτdk,
∫
∞
−∞
|ln|F(τ)||
1 + τ2
dτ <∞.
The function F(τ) cannot have a compact support with respect to τ and cannot decay exponentially; however, it can be arbitrarily strongly
localized and possess a decay rate arbitrarily close to the exponential one, e.g.
F(τ) ∝ exp {−ατ/ln(ln...lnτ)},
where α can be any real number. With this in mind, we shall for simplicity use the finite domains when specifying the limits of integration.
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Preparation of the extended states when the protocol is started at time tA = 0 requires the access to the entire
domain ΩA of size L. Intuitively, one can imagine a non-local device of size L which is simultaneously switched on at
all point of the domain. There are no any formal arguments prohibiting such a state preparation procedure at time
tA = 0. An extended state can also be prepared by a localized (point-like) source which is switched on at tA = 0
and produces (emits) a state propagating into the communication channel. For definiteness, it will be more convenient
for us to assume that the state is prepared by a non-local source at time tA = 0 and is immediately allowed at time
t = tA + 0 to propagate as a whole into the communication channel.
It is important for the protocol that the length of the quantum communication channel Lch should not exceed the
effective state extent L, Lch < L.
At some later time tB when the entire state reaches the domain ΩB of size L controlled by user B, he performs a
measurement described by the following identity resolution:
I =
∫ ∞
−∞
dx|x, tB〉〈x, tB | ⊗ IC2 = P0(tB) + P1(tB) + P⊥(tB), P0,1(tB) = |FtB , e0,1〉〈FtB , e0,1|, (14)
|FtB , e0,1〉 =
∫ ∞
−∞
dxF(x− tB)|x, tB〉 ⊗ |e0,1〉, x ∈ ΩB, P⊥(tB) = I − P0(tB)− P1(tB). (15)
In other words, user B takes the projection on one of the two states whose amplitude resides entirely in the domain
ΩB. The probabilities of different outcomes at time tB are
Pr{i, tB; j} = Tr{|ψi〉〈ψi|Pj(tB)} = δij
∫
{L}
dx|F(x− tB)|2 = δij , x ∈ ΩB. (16)
If the eavesdropper does not delay the states, he never has access to them as a whole. Therefore, the probability
of incorrect state identification by the eavesdropper will be different from zero even for orthogonal states. It should
be emphasized that due to the orthogonal polarizations our states are even locally orthogonal. Formally, that means
that if at certain moment of time the eavesdropper has only access to a spatial domain smaller than the effective
extent of the states to be distinguished, the state identification error probability is different from zero. The total error
probability is the sum of two terms. The first one describes the situation when the measuring apparatus used by the
eavesdropper did not fire at all. These outcomes are inevitable if the entire states are not available as a whole. The
error probability in that case is 1/2 (it is actually the error probability for simple guessing strategy). The second term
in the total error corresponds to the case when the eavesdropper’s apparatus fired in the spatial domain available to
the eavesdropper. The state identification error in that case is strictly zero because of the local orthogonality of the
states employed. Therefore, the total error is the product of the error for the case when the outcome occurred in the
domain unavailable to the eavesdropper and the fraction of such outcomes. More formally, the total error is
Pe(tE) = Pe(ΩE , tE) + Pe(ΩE , tE); (17)
here ΩE is the domain available to the eavesdropper (accordingly, ΩE is the unavailable domain, i.e. the completion of
ΩE to the entire position space) and tE is the moment of time when the measurement in the domain ΩE was performed.
The total identity resolution is
I = I(ΩE , tE)+I(ΩE , tE), I(ΩE , tE) =
∑
i=0,1
∫
ΩE
dx|x, tE , ei〉〈x, tE , ei|, I(ΩE , tE) =
∑
i=0,1
∫
ΩB
dx|x, tE , ei〉〈x, tE , ei|.
(18)
Arbitrary strategy with a binary decision function for the outcomes in the domain ΩE is described by an appropriate
identity resolution on ΩE . The lowest error probability Pe(ΩE , tE) is found by the minimization over all possible identity
resolutions I(ΩE) [16]
Pe(ΩE , tE) = min
E0,E1
{
1
2
Tr{|ψ0〉〈ψ0|E1}+ 1
2
Tr{|ψ1〉〈ψ1|E0}
}
. (19)
E0,1 is easily found and the total state identification error Pe(ΩE , tE) ≡ 0 proves to be
E0,1 =
∫
ΩE
dx|x, tE ; e0,1〉〈x, tE ; e0,1|, Pe(ΩEtE) = 1
2
N(ΩE , tE) =
1
2
∫
ΩE
dx|F(x − tE)|2. (20)
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Accordingly, if the spatial domain ΩE available to the eavesdropper has a fixed size, the probability of correct identi-
fication by the eavesdropper of the bit sent by user A is
POK(tE) = 1− Pe(ΩEtE)− Pe(ΩEtE) = 1
2
(
1 +
∫
ΩE
dx|F(x − tE)|2
)
. (21)
Thus the information on the bit sent by user A available to the eavesdropper depends on the size of the available
domain and the choice of the moment when the measurement is performed. This information can be calculated using
Eq. (5) taking into account that the measurement is described by the identity resolution {Ei} = {IΩE , E0, E1} (where
E0,1 are taken from Eq. (20)). The available information is a sum of two terms. The first term describes the part of
the mutual information given by the outcomes in the unavailable domain (when the eavesdropper’s apparatus did not
fire at all) while the second one originates from the outcomes in the available domain ΩE :
I(A;E,ΩE , tE) = I(A;E, ρ0, ρ1,ΩE , tE) + I(A;E, ρ0, ρ1,ΩE , tE). (22)
Calculation according to Eq. (5) taking into account that {Ei} = {IΩE , E0, E1} and pi0 = pi1 = 1/2 yields
I(A;E, ρ0, ρ1,ΩE , tE) = 0, Tr{ρ0,1IΩE} =
1
2
Tr{ρIΩE}, ρ =
1
2
(ρ0 + ρ1), (23)
I(A;E, ρ0, ρ1,ΩE , tE) =
∫
ΩE
dx|F(x − tE)|2, Tr{ρ0E0} = Tr{ρ1E1} = Tr{ρE0,1}. (24)
Therefore, the largest mutual information on the transmitted bit available to the eavesdropper depends on the moment
of the measurement and the fraction of the state residing in the available domain. In this way the propagation of
information in the space-time is explicitly accounted for, in contrast to the protocols formulated in the state space only.
It is not surprising that the mutual information due to outcomes in the unavailable domain is zero since the state
identification error probability in that case is 1/2. On the other hand, if the outcome took place in the available
domain, the identification error is zero, so that the mutual information is proportional to the fraction of outcomes
occurring in the available domain. To increase the mutual information, the eavesdropper should effectively extend
the available domain (wait until a larger part of the state travel from the domain controlled by user A to the domain
available to his measurements).
Let the effective increase in the domain size available to the eavesdropper (compared to the length of the commu-
nication channel which is supposed to be entirely available to him) is χ. The correct identification probability for the
eavesdropper is
PrE{χ} = 1
2
(
1 +
∫
{Lch+χ}
dx|F(x − tE)|2
)
=
1
2
(
1 +
Lch + χ
L
)
. (25)
For any state |F˜〉 delayed by time (distance) χ, the probability of passing a test for possible delay based on the outcomes
of the measurement (14,15) performed by the legitimate user B is
PrB{χ} = Tr{|F˜〉〈F˜ |(P0(tB) + P1(tB))} = (26)
∣∣∣ ∫
{L−χ}
dxF(x − tB)F˜∗(x− tB)
∣∣∣2 ≤
(∫
{L−χ}
dx|F(x − tB)|2
)(∫
{L−χ}
dx|F˜(x− tB)|2
)
≤
(
1− χ
L
)
.
It is sufficient to consider pure delayed states F˜ only, since the linearity arguments can be applied to the case of mixed
states. In Eq. (26) we took advantage of the Cauchy-Bunyakowskii inequality. The integration domain is restricted
to L− χ since because of the limited propagation velocity, no state delayed by time χ cannot reach by the moment of
measurement tB the extreme right boundary of domain L; remember also that F(x − tB) = 1/
√
L.
Thus the probability for the eavesdropper to know the transmitted bit and simultaneously pass the test performed
by user B is
Pr{bitE = bitA
∧
E pass test, χ} = PrE{χ}·PrB{χ} = 1
2
(
1 +
Lch + χ
L
)
·
(
1− χ
L
)
, Prmax =
1
2
(
1 +
Lch
L
)
. (27)
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Therefore, for a specified channel length the probability maximum in Eq. (27) is reached at the interval boundary at
χ = 0. If the channel length equals the effective state extent (Lch = L), this probability is unit. In that case the
eavesdropper can reliably know each transmitted state and remain undetected. For Lch = 0 the maximum is reached
at χ = 0 and the probability is 1/2, which means that the eavesdropper simply guesses the transmitted state.
Up to this moment, we have not yet taken into account the noise in communication channel. Let us demonstrate
now that in a noisy channel the probability (27) cannot exceed the corresponding value for the ideal channel. To do
this, we shall take advantage of the relativistic causality arguments. The state modification induced by noise can be
described by an appropriate instrument taking into account the relativistic restrictions imposed on it. The instrument
can generally be written as [24–27]
T [...] =
∑
k
Sk[...]S+k , Sk =
√
λk|φk〉〈ϕk|,
∑
k
λkSkS+k ≤ 1, λk ≥ 0, (28)
Tr{T [|ψ0,1〉〈ψ0,1|]I(ΩE , te)} =
∑
k
Tr{|ψ0,1〉〈ψ0,1|(SkI(ΩE , te)S+k )} ≤
∑
k
λkTr{|ψ0,1〉〈ψ0,1|(|ϕk〉〈ϕk|)} ≤ (29)
∑
k
λk|〈ϕk|ψ0,1〉|2 ≤
∑
k
λk〈ϕk|ϕk〉〈ψ0,1|ψ0,1〉 ≤ 〈ψ0,1|ψ0,1〉 =
∫
ΩA
dx
∣∣∣F(x− tA)∣∣∣2 = ∫
ΩE
dx
∣∣∣F(x− tE)∣∣∣2.
The last equality in Eq. (29) reflects the fact that the amplitude F(x− tA) of state
|ψ0,1〉 =
∫
ΩA
dxF(x − tA)|x, tA〉 ⊗ |e0,1〉 =
∫
ΩE
dxF(x − tE)|x, tE〉 ⊗ |e0,1〉 (30)
at time tA is completely localized in the domain x ∈ ΩA, and will not be completely localized in domain x ∈ ΩE earlier
than at tE = tA+dist(ΩE ,ΩA). Strictly speaking, in the field theory the problem cannot be treated as a single-particle
one in the sense that the operator Sˆ involves the processes associated with creation of particles and absorption of other
photons entering the channel from the environment which can be treated as a sort of noise. However, detection of these
external photons can obviously provide no additional information on the transmitted bit. Therefore, the probability for
the eavesdropper to know an individual transmitted bit and remain undetected by the legitimate user B does not exceed
the corresponding probability Prmax = 1/2(1 + Lch/L) for the ideal channel.
Let us know describe the protocol.
• At the time moments agreed upon beforehand, user A prepares and sends into the communication channel the states
|ψ0,1〉, while user B performs measurements described by the identity resolution (14,15). Only the bits which pass
the test (i.e. those which produced the outcomes in channels P0,1(tB)) are kept, and all the rest transmissions are
discarded (P⊥(tB)). If the channel is ideal and eavesdropping is absent, each bit sent by user A is reliably identified
by user B and contributes to the key (in contrast to the cryptosystems based on non-orthogonal states).
• Then the noise (identification error probability) is estimated. Users A and B disclose some of the transmissions
and obtain an estimate for the error probability perr counting the number of inconsistencies in their data sets. The
disclosed bits are discarded from the transmitted string.
• The “antedate” coding is performed. User A divides the remaining transmissions into the groups each consisting of
k identical bits (either all zeros or all units) and announces through a public channel which transmission belongs to
which group without disclosing the values of the bits occurring in each group. User B performs the error correction
for each block employing a simple majority voting principle [28]. The number k is chosen sufficiently large to reduce
the error in identification of the block-wise bits b˜it(i) (0˜ =
k︷ ︸︸ ︷
{0, 0, ...0} and 1˜ =
k︷ ︸︸ ︷
{1, 1, ...1}) below ≈ pkerr ≪ perr. This
procedure enhances the probability of survival of the bit string finally accepted both users as the generated key. Then
the block-wise bits are assigned their reference numbers.
• The users form N+M parity bits Bit =∑ni=1⊕b˜it(i) from the block-wise bits. This is achieved by user A announcing
the reference numbers of the block-wise bits included into each parity bit. Produced in this way is a new string of
parity bits.
• Hashing procedure consisting of M rounds is applied to N +M parity bits Bit(j), j = 1..N +M . To do this, user
A in each round chooses a random string sl of length N +M − l (l = 1...M) and announces it to user B through a
public channel. Then user A and B check the parities of the subsets of bits in their strings (BitA and BitB) comparing
the parities with the string sl, since sl ·BitA = sl ·BitB = (sl ·BitA)⊕ (sl ·BitB) = sl · (BitA ⊕BitB). If the parities
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of the substrings coincide, one bit in the specified position is discarded form the strings BitA and BitB. If the parities
are different, the protocol is aborted. After M successful rounds the probability for the two remaining strings BitA
and BitB possessed by users A and B, respectively, and each consisting of N parity bits to be different is [29]
Pr{sA(N) 6= sB(N)} = 2−M . (31)
By appropriate choice ofM one can always make this probability sufficiently small. Hence the first part of the protocol
security criterion (Eqs. (1) and (2)) is proved.
• The probability for the eavesdropper to reliably know one of the parity bits and remain undetected is calculated in
the following way. The total number of ways in which every parity bit can be built from the block-wise bits is [30]
1
2
n∑
i=0
Ci·kn·k =
2n·k
2k
k∑
l=1
cosn·k (
lpi
k
) cos (nlpi) ≈ 1
2k
2n·k. (32)
The Hartley information of the set of block-wise strings is (to within the rounding error) the number of binary symbols
required to identify the string parity which practically coincides with the string length n · k:
I = log2(
2n·k
2k
k∑
l=1
cosn·k (
lpi
k
) cos (nlpi)) ≈ η n · k, η ≈ 1, (33)
that is almost all the bits in the string should be known. The probability of knowing every bit and passing the test is
does not exceed (27) so that the conditional probability for the eavesdropper to know N final bits (key) transmitted
by user A and accepted by both users as the key is (remember that (1 + Lch/L)/2 < 1)
Pr{sA(N) = sE(N)} = 2−N{1+ 2 · 2−ηn·k[(1 +Lch/L)]η·n·k}N = 2−N(1 + 2ζ)N , ζ = 2−ηn·k[(1 +Lch/L)]η·n·k. (34)
Mutual information on the string of final bits of length N possessed by user A available to the eavesdropper is
I(A;E) = I(A)− I(A|E), I(A) = −log22−N , I(A|E) = −log2Pr{sA(N) = sE(N)}, (35)
where I(A) is the proper information of the final string sA(N) of length N , I(A|E) is the conditional information
on the string sA(N) available to E. Since all possible bit strings arise with the same probability and the conditional
probability for all strings is the same, we use the information which is not yet averaged over the string distribution.
The conditional information has a natural interpretation as the number of additional bits required for E to reliably
recover the bit string of length N . As to the mutual information, it is interpreted as the number of bits measuring
the information on string sA(N) of length N available to the eavesdropper [31]. Taking into account Eqs. (34,35) one
obtains for the mutual information between A and E:
I(A;E) = N −N +N log2(1 + 2ζ) ≈
2N · ζ
ln 2
= 2N · 2−ηn·k[(1 + Lch/L)]η·n·k/ln 2≪ 1. (36)
For any specified N , Lch, and L (Lch < L) this information can be made exponentially small in the parameter n · k.
• Let us now show that the mutual information available to E on the string sB(N) is also exponentially small. Mutual
information between A and B is
I(A;B) = I(A) − I(A|B) = −log22−N + log2 Pr{sA(N) = sB(N)} = N + log2(1− 2−M ) ≈ N −
2−M
ln 2
. (37)
Taking advantage of the triangle inequality for the information [32] one finally obtains
I(A|E) ≤ I(A|B) + I(B|E), I(B|E) ≥ N − (2N · ζ − 2−M )/ln 2, I(B;E) ≤ (2N · ζ − 2−M )/ln 2≪ 1. (38)
Thus the second part of (Eqs. (3) and (4)) of the security criterion is also proved.
We are grateful to Lev Vaidman for useful discussion of obtained results.
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